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Gary Becker's Treatise on the Family [1) is not only an impressive collection of
results, but also a magnificent seed-catalog of ideas, many of which have since
germinated and been raised to vigorous adulthood by Becker and his co-workers.
These progeny are ably surveyed in the Handbook on Population Theory [56),
soon to appear on your library shelves. The current paper is a much more
modest advertisement for some facts and ideas that I think likely to bear fruit
in the form of a richer theory of the economics of the family.
This discussion refers frequently to work in other disciplines, particularly an-
thropology and biology. It is easy to convince economists that economic analysis
can usefully be applied to all other subjects. But economists seem less ready
to believe that reading anthropology, biology, history, psychology, or sociology
is important for doing good economic analysis. Because of the intimate con-
nection between the family and reproduction, it should not be surprising that
there is much to be learned about the economics of the family from the study
of evolutionary biology. Given the increased prevalence in recent decades of
unwed parenthood, divorce with sequential monogamy, and "non-traditional"
family arrangements, it seems plausible that anthropological studies of alterna-
tive family structures would help us to understand our own.
The first section presents an evolutionary theory of interpersonal sympathy
among family members. We discuss the genetic theory of kin selection and its
implications for human preferences and relate these ideas to theories of the cul-
tural evolution of preferences. The next section takes an evolutionary viewpoint
in exploring the riddles posed by the demographic transition and the question of
intergenerational flows of wealth. The third section discusses non-monogamous
family structures in our own culture and in other cultures. The final section
draws on a more traditional source of inspiration for economists. This section
outlines an approach to bargaining theory within the family based on recent
discoveries in non-cooperative game theory and discusses ways of integrating
the theory of spousal bargaining with the theory of marriage markets.
1 Preferences in Family Matters
1.1 Adam Smith and Sympathetic Preferences
Let us begin with Adam. Smith opens his treatise, The Theory of Moral Senti-
ments [60) as follows:
"How selfish, soever, man may be supposed, there are evidently
some principles in nature, which interest him in the fortune of oth-
ers, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives
nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.-
In a later chapter, entitled: Of the Order in which Individuals are recom-
mended by Nature to our care and attention, Smith elaborates as follows on the
"principles in nature which interest men in the fortunes of others":
"Every man feels his own pleasures and his own pains more sen-
sibly than those of other people. The.former are the original sensa-
tions; the latter the reflected or symj athetic images of these sensa-
tions.
After himself, the members of his own family, those who usually
live in the same house with him, his parents, his brothers and sisters
are naturally the objects of his warmest affections... his sympathy
with them is more precise and determinatethan it can be with the
greater part of other people. It approaches, nearer, in short, to what
he feels for himself.
This sympathy too, and the affections that are founded on it, are
by nature more strongly directed towards his children than towards
his parents, and his tenderness for the former seems generally a
more active principle, than his reverence and gratitude toward the
latter....
The children of brothers and sisters are naturally connected by
the friendship which, after separating into different families, contin-
ues to take place between their parents... .
The children of cousins, being still less connected, are of still less
importance to one another; and the affection gradually diminishes
as the relation grows more and more remote." (Chapter VI)
The Theory of Moral Sentiments was published in 1759, exactly 100 years
before Charles Darwin's Origin of the Species. [20] Not surprisingly, Smith nei-
ther sought nor found an evolutionary explanation for a positive association be-
tween intensity of sympathy and degree of relatedness. His conclusion appears
to be based entirely on empirical observation.
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Yet Smith's phrase "the Order
in which Individuals are recommended by Nature to our care and attention,"
seems felicitiously to foreshadow the possibility of an evolutionary explanation
for Smith's observations on the varying degree of sympathy between relatives.
1.2 Kin Selection in Evolutionary Biology
Hamilton's Rule
Modern evolutionary biologists have developed a beautiful and powerful theory
of the evolutionary foundations of sympathy between relatives. The founder of
'Smith suggests that this sympathy is caused by close physical association, remarking that
physical separation reduces, but does not eliminate these affections. But Smith also observes
that "A jealous husband ... often regards with hatred and aversion that unhappy child which
he supposes to be the offspring of his wife's infidelity."
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the modern theory of kin selection, William Hamilton [34] describes this theory
as follows:
"The social behavior of a species evolves in such a way that in
each distinct behavior-evoking situation the individual will seem to
value his neighbors' fitness against his own, according to the coeffi-
cients of relationship appropriate to the situation."
Biologists define the "coefficient of relationship" between two individuals to
be the probability that a randomly selected gene from one of these individuals
and the the corresponding gene from the other are both copied from a common
ancestor. These coefficients of relationships can be readily calculated under var-
ious assumptions about mating patterns. In a sexually reproducing species with
diploid genetic structure like our own, if mating couples are not closely related,
the coefficients of relationship relationship between kin are approximately as
follows:
Coefficients of Relationship Between Kin
Parent-child 1 2
Full siblings 1/2
Half siblin 1 4
Grandparent-grandchild 1/4
Aunt or Uncle-nephew or niece 1 4
First cousins under monogamy) 1/8
It has become common practice for biologists and evolutionary ecologists to
predict animal behavior with a form of benefit-cost analysis, known as "Hamil-
ton's rule." Hamilton's rule states that an animal, when offered an opportunity
to confer a benefit of B units of "fitness" on another animal at a cost to itself
of C units of "fitness" to itself, will choose to do so if and only if
Genetically-programmed Utility Functions
Hamilton's Rule is usually interpreted as a prediction about genetically hard-
wired traits or behavioral rules that are invoked by specific stimuli. Biologists
have found many examples in which individuals routinely take actions that
reduce their own survival probability but increase the survival probability of
their relatives. Small birds and mammals emit shrieks and warnings at the
approach of a predator. In some bird species, individuals help to feed the
offspring of their parents or siblings. Caterpillars who leave a bad taste in the
mouth of a predator do not improve their own survival probability by this form
of revenge, but do reduce the likelihood that the predator will eat a relative.
In species that face highly variable environments, much behavior seems more
complex than a direct stimulus-response connection. Individuals are able to
process and use information and to choose actions in a consistent way. It is
natural for economists to think of such individuals as endowed with a preference
ordering or a utility function. Natural selection could act on these preferences,
in the same way that it acts on hard-wired behavioral responses.
Much as economists postulate that individuals maximize "utility," biologists
postulate that individuals maximize "fitness". Typically an individual's fitness
is defined to be the expected number of surviving offspring that the individual
produces.' Hamilton proposed the following definition of extended fitness. Let
F be the fitness of individual j and let r;3 is the coefficient of relationship
between individuals i and j.The extended fitness H; of individual i is a weighted
sum of i's own fitness and that of its its relatives, namely:
Hi = F; + riy F. (2)
Br > C, (1)
where r is the coefficient of relationship between them. Hamilton's theory of
kin selection is central to the modern study of animal behavior, playing an
essential role in the understanding of cooperative behavior among animals,
parent-offspring conflict, parental investment, and sexual strategies of males
and females. The rich interplay of theory and empirical observation in the evo-
lutionary theory of animal behavior is demonstrated in Robert Trivers' Social
Evolution [62].2
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For economists wanting an introduction to this subject, Trivers' book seems an ideal
starting point. It assumes no prior knowledge of biology but presents the relevant biological
information in a way that is readily grasped by economists, and moves smoothly and quickly
to matters of profound interest both to biologists and economists.
It is appealing to conjucture that evolutionary biologists may have discovered
an evolutionary foundation for Adam Smith's "Order in which Individuals are
recommended by Nature to our can and attention." Not only have they found
an ordinal ranking of relatives that corresponds with Smith's notion, but they
appear to have found a cardinal quantitative measure of the degree of sympathy
that nature recommends that we extend toward each of our relatives. The
language of modern game theory allows us to pose this conjecture more sharply.
Consider a set of relatives who interact with each other. Each relative j, selects
a strategy sa, from a set S; of possible strategies. Let a be the vector listing the
strategies chosen by each player and let the "fitness" of any individual j be a
function F(s). For each i, define the extended fitness payoff function Ui(s) so
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This definition can be problematic. For example, it may be that by having fewer but
wealthier children, one can have more surviving grandchildren. (See Rogers [(s] for an inter-
esting discussion of this issue.) The problem of defining fitness becomes even more complex
if children are treated asymmetrically as in the case of primogeniture. Bergstrom (4) suggests




Hi(s) = F(s) + riF,(s). (3)
The conjecture is that evolutionary forces tend to produce a population of in-
dividuals who act as if they are choosing Nash best responses in a game where
their payoff functions are the extended fitness payoff functions given by Equation
3.
Hamilton's theoretical argument supports this conjecture only for the special
case where benefits conferred and costs incurred interact additively. Economic
models with diminishing returns and other more complicated interactions be-
tween individual contributions do not display this additivity. When interactions
are not additive, it is not in general the case that individuals will be extended
fitness maximizers in equilibrium. However, the first-order conditions derived
from Hamilton's rule correctly characterize equilibrium behavior. The logic of
kin selection and the intuition that underlies these conclusions will be clarified
by a look at the special case of kin selection among siblings.4
Kin Selection for Siblings
Suppose that individuals do not choose their strategies, but are programmed by
their genes. Assume that this strategy taken is determined by the two genes
that lie in a single genetic locus and that genes are passed from generation to
generation according to the Mendelian laws of inheritance. A monomorphic
equilbrum is a situation in which every individual in the population has a pair
of identical genes in this locus, and these genes program the individual to use
strategy z. We seek conditions under which this population will resist invasion
by a mutant gene such that carriers of the mutant gene use a different strategy
y. A mutant gene will be able to establish a presence in the population if,
when it is rare, carriers of the mutant gene are more likely to survive than
normal z-strategists. Conversely, there will be a monomorphic equilibrium of
x-strategists if carriers of any rare mutant gene that leads to a different strategy
are less likely to survive than the normal z-strategists.5
Mendelian inheritance is a blunt instrument which does not act on individ-
uals independently of its effects on their kin. Someone who inherits a mutant
gene is more likely than a normal individual to have siblings who also carry the
mutant gene. An individual who is led by a mutant gene to sacrifice some of
her own survival probability for the benefit of her siblings is also more likely
than a normal individual to benefit from the generous actions of a sibling. If
the mutant gene is a rare dominant gene, then almost all carriers of the gene
4This example was introduced by Bergstrom and Stark [61 and is explored in detail by
Bergstrom (51.
rThe discussion here concerns invasion by a dominant mutant gene. A more detailed
discussion of the genetics involved, along with a treatment of the case of invasion by recessive
mutant genes is discussed in [5).
will be children of one normal parent and one parent who carries a single copy
of the mutant gene. By the laws of heredity, the mutant gene will then with
probability 1/2 be found in each sibling of an individual who carries the mutant
gene. Suppose that individuals with the normal genes are programmed to take
strategy z and carriers of the mutant gene are programmed to take action y.
Then mutants who take a mutant action y toward a sibling will find that with
probability 1/2, the sibling also takes the action y and with probability 1/2 the
sibling takes the normal action zx. Therefore the expected payoff to a carrier of
the mutant gene is
V((y, z) = 2 F(y, y) + F(y, z). (4)
The function V is called a semi-Kantian utility function, since it can be ex-
pressed by a maxim that could be characterized as halfway between selfishness
and the Kantian ethic:
"Act toward your sibling as you would if you believed that with
probability one-half, your sibling would copy your action."
If natural selection is for utility functions rather than for hard-wired actions,
then we would expect evolution to produce utility functions towards siblings
that take the semi-Kantian form found in Equation 4.
In the case of a symmetric game between siblings, Hamilton's extended fit-
ness function (given in Equation 3) takes the simple form:
H(y, z) = F(y, z) + F(z, y) (6)
which can be expressed as the rule:
"Value your sibling's survival half as much as your own."
Bergstrom [5] shows examples of simple games (including prisoners' dilemma)
where the equilibrium actions predicted by the extended fitness utility function
are not the same as those for the semi-Kantian utility function. However, if
the fitness function F is differentiable, then the first-order calculus conditions
for equilibrium in a population of extended fitness maximizers are the same
as the first-order calculus conditions in a population of semi-Kantian utility
maximizers.
1.3 Imitation and Cultural Evolution
The great variety of behavior and values across cultures and subcultures that
we observe seems to be evidence that human preferences are partially formed
by cultural rather than genetic influences. There is abundant direct evidence
that people adopt opinions, attitudes, tastes, and goals by imitation of parents,
playmates, teachers, and neighbors. In The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins [22]
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introduces the term meme to describe a culturally transmitted norm that is
passed along much in the way genes are inherited. The logic of cultural inheri-
tance and imitation bears an intriguing similarity to that of genetic inheritance.
Luigi Cavalli-Sforza and Marcus Feldman [17] define cultural transmission to be
"vertical" if cultural traits are passed from parents to children, "horizontal" if
these traits are passed between persons of the same age, and "oblique" if they
are passed from members of an older generation to members of a younger gener-
ation who are not their own children. The work of Cavelli-Sforza and Feldman,
and subsequent work by Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson [15] demonstrate
convincingly that the abstract structure of cultural transmission lends itself to
formal modelling almost as well as the Mendelian genetic model. Bergstrom
and Stark [6] explore some applications of cultural evolution in the behavior of
siblings and neighbors. While the structure of vertical cultural transmission is
very close to that of genetic evolution, horizontal and oblique transmission in-
troduce a number of new possibilities for the pathways of inheritance. It is also
important to notice that cultural evolution, especially with horizontal transmis-
sion, can occur much more rapidly than genetic evolution occur, with the rise
and fall of cultural institutions being observable well within the range of written
history.
1.4 On the usefulness of evolutionary hypotheses
Human evolution proceeds slowly. Most evolutionary biologists believe that our
bodies and minds are, for the most part adaptations to hunter-gatherer life in the
Stone Age. The "adaptationist" view that current preferences are the optimal
preferences for reproductive success under current conditions seems indefensible.
This problem is eloquently addressed by Randolph Nesse and George Williams
in Why We Get Sick [50].6 Nesse and Wilson ask:
'Why, in a body of such exquisite design, are there a thousand
flaws and frailties that make us vulnerable to disease?...
Even our behavior and emotions seem to have been shaped by a
prankster. Why do we crave the very foods that are bad for us? ...
Why do we keep eating when we know we are too fat? ... Why are
male and female sexual responses so uncoordinated, instead of being
shaped for maximummutualsatisfaction?... Finally, why do we find
happiness so elusive? The design of our bodies is simultaneously
extraordinarily precise and unbelievably slipshod. It is as if the best
engineers in the universe took every seventh day off and turned the
world over to bumbling amateurs." (p. 5)
Nesse and Williams propose two kinds of answers: (i) Our bodies are the
result of evolution, not design. Although evolution produces outcomes of mag-
'This book makes a very interesting case for the application of evolutionary principles to
medicine.
nificent complexity and efficacy, evolved creatures remain, in many ways, pris-
oners of the historical path of evolution and differ drastically from the result of
an optimal top-down design. (ii) Some of our physical and psychological traits
that were well-adapted for the Stone Age environments are poorly adapted for
the modern environment. While selection may be acting against these traits,
the process is extremely slow relative to the rate of change in our environment.
Since our knowledge of Stone Age living conditions is and will remain ex-
tremely sketchy, many scholars have concluded that the evolutionary hypothesis
has little empirical content and is simply an invitation to unfalsifiable specula-
tion. A more optimistic view is that we can learn much about Stone Age condi-
tions by observing existing tribes of hunter-gatherers. Anthropologists (see for
example, Hill and Kaplan) have conducted detailed studies of economic life in
present-day hunter-gatherer societies that have had minimal contact with the
modern world. While these studies are of great interest, the authors are quick
to acknowledge that they find great differences among existing hunter-gatherer
societies. Moreover, there is no compelling evidence that the conditions that
hunter-gatherers face today are sufficiently similar to those faced by the ances-
tral societies from which we have evolved as to allow us to make useful inferences
about evolution.
Matters are made even more difficult by the fact that our preferences seem
to be formed partly by cultural forces and partly by genetic coding. Thus a fully
satisfactory evolutionary theory of preference formation might have to untangle
the genetically inherited from the culturally inherited aspects of our preferences.
The objection that human behavior evolved in a remote, unobservable past
would be quite devastating to a theory that we have evolved a series of reflexes
that lead us to make specific responses in specific situations. Certainly there
are examples of human responses that can be so described. Nesse and Williams
cite human responses that seem to be genetically encoded, including specific
food-aversions (especially among young children) that may have protected our
ancestors from eating poisonous plants, reflex responses to burns, pain in injured
limbs, aversion to human feces and vomit, fear aroused by certain cues, and
sexual arousal. In these cases, the stimuli being responded to appear to be
nearly universal in human experience and to be such that the optimal response
would not have changed much through the millenia.
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For dealing with more complex situations, nature has supplied us with
problem-solving abilities and a complex of rather general tastes and desires
that are likely to be correlated with reproductive success in a great variety of
situations. Given the great variety of environments in which our species has
thrived, it is reasonable to expect that the genetic coding of preferences allows
great flexibility and that hard-wired preferences are for the most part pref-
erences that have served our ancestors' reproductive interests well in a great
T
Of course there may be selection bias here. Nesse and Williams may have noticed and
written about these responses precisely because they are as comprehensible in terms of today's
environments as they must have been in the Stone Age.
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variety of circumstances. These include preferences regarding such staples of
the human condition as nutrition, temperature-regulation, leisure, and friendly
social relations with peers and allies. Central to the experience of those whose
genes have been preserved are reproduction, child-rearing and growth to ma-
turity. Accordingly, preferences related to the desire for reproduction and to
sympathetic concern for one's children and other relatives are prime candidates
for genetic encoding.
Even if it is difficult to determine whether preferences are culturally or genet-
ically determined, the hypotheses of genetic transmission and vertical cultural
inheritance have similar implications for equilibrium outcomes. Oblique and
horizontal cultural transmission allow outcomes that would not be sustained
by genetic transmission or vertical transmission. But, as is demonstrated by
Cavelli-Sforza and Feldman (and also by Bergstrom and Stark) these hypothe-
ses impose a structure that may help us to analyze and understand the outcomes
that we observe.
2 The Demographic Transition
2.1 Cultural Evolution and the Demographic Transition
The demographic transition, which began in Western Europe and has now spread
to much of Asia, is an especially interesting instance of cultural evolution. A fall
in infant mortality in the late 18th and early 19th century was followed, with a
time lag, by a sharp decrease in completed family sizes in most countries of Eu-
rope. That birth rates eventually fell in response to a fall in the death rate is not
surprising. Declining infant mortality means that the number of children who
survive to adulthood would be much larger if birth rates stayed constant. Nor is
it surprising that the response would have been lagged, as people only gradually
came to understand that traditional practices lead to larger numbers of surviv-
ing children than before. Traditionalists who maintained high birth rates would
have had untraditionally large families. Particularly in a peasant economy with
scarce land, this may have meant that many of their surviving children would
have been to poor to marry and produce children of their own. Persons with
"mutant" aspirations, who planned to have fewer births and to leave more re-
sources to each of them, might have actually produced more grandchildren and
descendants than those with high birth rates. Thus if aspirations for number of
births were "vertically transmitted" from parents to children, it is possible that
low birth rate aspirations were passed on to more reproductive children than
the high birth rate aspirations.
But the demographic transition seems to have gone beyond the reduction in
fertility that would maximize surviving descendants. The number of children
born to most women has fallen well below the number that would maximize
the number of their grandchildren. Indeed, despite increasing per capita wealth
during the 19th and 20th centuries, average numbers of surviving children per
family decreased rather than increased. As Cavelli-Sforza and Feldman point
out, the cultural norm of having small families could not prevail if reproductive
decisions were vertically transmitted from parents to children. With vertical
transmission, mothers who bear fewer children would have fewer reproductive
daughters to imitate their reproductive choices. The number of women who
carry the low birth rate cultural trait would therefore dwindle relative to the
population of mothers who choose to have many children.
Cavelli-Sforza and Feldman conclude that the norm of having small fam-
ilies must have been supported by horizontal or oblique transmission-people
imitating their peers or parents peers, rather than their parents. If the "small-
family strategy" succeeded because of horizontal or oblique transmission, then
it must have been that the small-family strategy practiced by other families was
somehow more attractive to the next generation than the large-family strategy
practiced by its parents. This force had to be strong enough to overcome the
tendency of vertical transmission to eliminate the small family strategy.
It is useful to know that horizontal or oblique transmission is needed in order
to sustain the cultural trait of wanting small families, while vertical transmis-
sion would this extinguish trait. But the question remains unanswered: "Why
would we expect that aspirations to have small families would be more likely
to be horizontally transmitted than aspirations to have large families." One
reasonable response is that children of large families will observe that people
with small families live more comfortable lives and will want to emulate them,
while children from small families will not find the life styles of large families
similarly tempting.
It may be illuminating to pose the question in the following way. Why
would not the small-family norm eventually be overwhelmed by followers of a
fundamentalist religion with a pro-natalist doctrine like the following: It is your
duty to produce three or four surviving children and it is your duty to pass this
doctrine on to all of your children. Given current income levels in Western
countries, the costs of adhering to this doctrine do not seem heavy, compared to
the costs of practicing obligations that historically successful religions have im-
posed. If this religion were successfully established and maintained, its followers
would eventually swamp a population in which the average number of children
per family is approximately two. There are two possible restraining forces that
might prevent adherents of such a religion from outrunning the adherents of a
small family norm. (i) Even though its adherents cling devoutly to the doctrine,
it might be that after a few generations, their wealth would be dissipated and
that most adherents simply could not afford to raise three or four children who
survive to adulthood. (ii) It might eventually not be possible for believing par-
ents would to convince more than two of their children to adopt a pronatalist
doctrine.
There remains another possibility. Perhaps the low birth rates currently
observed in the West do not represent long run equilibrium. If a pro-natalist
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norm starts with a small number of adherents, even if they are able to pass it
on to most of their children, it would take many generations for its descendants
to outnumber the original population. In most countries of Western Europe
and North America, low average birth rates have been present for only three
or four generations-far too short a time for vertical transmission to replace the
low-fertility norm.
2.2 The Direction of Intergenerational Wealth Flows
John Caldwell [16], a demographer, advanced the theory that there are two
types of societies, pre-transitional societies which are characterized by high sta-
ble birth rates and by net wealth flows running from younger to older gen-
erations and post-transitional societies which have low fertility and net wealth
flows running from older generations to younger generations. In pre-transitional
societies, having children is profitable so people would choose to reproduce up
to the biological limit. In post-transitional societies, where children are costly,
people limit their fertility much as they limit their consumption of other costly
consumer goods.
As Paul Turke [64] observes, the view that in traditional societies, resource
flows were, on average, directed from younger to older generations is difficult
to reconcile either with an evolutionary or a Malthusian model of populations.
Hillard Kaplan [37] explains the evolutionary viewpoint as follows:
"In contrast to wealth-flows theory, models of fertility and parental
investment derived from evolutionary biology expect that the net
flow of resources will always be from parents to offspring, even when
fertility is high. The logic underlying this expectation is that natu-
ral selection will have produced a preponderance of organisms that
are designed to extract resources from the environment and convert
those resources into descendants carrying replicas of their genetic
material. ... Organisms that extracted a net gain from offspring
would produce fewer genetic descendants than those that utilized
their own labor and excess energy to produce more viable offspring.
This does not mean that ... natural selection could not favor a posi-
tive flow from some offspring to parents or from offspring to parents
at some ages but that the overall intergenerational flow of resources
will be downward. "
According to Turke [64], most of the data that has been advanced in favor of
Caldwell's wealth-flows hypothesis takes the form of interviews without direct
quantitative measurement.
"In many such interviews parents do in fact aver that children
are economic assets. Often, however, they assert as well that a rea-
son for limiting births is that children are too costly. A commonly
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given noneconomic reason is that God (in various forms) wants peo-
ple to have many children. Of course, no reputable social scientist
would accept interview data as a basis for concluding that God is
pronatalist, and I suggest we should be just as skeptical of the claim
that interview data support the proposition that children are in fact
net economic assets in traditional societies."
Turke [63] offers evidence from field studies in the Micronesian islands of
Ifaluk and Yap (where people practice simple agriculture and fishing) that chil-
dren tend to be a net economic burden on their parents. Thomas Fricke [25]
indicates that Turke's evidence is indirect and far from decisive. In a recent
paper, based on remarkably detailed fieldwork
8 conducted among three differ-
ent tribes of hunter-gatherers, the Ache of Paraguay, the Piro of Peru, and the
Masiguenga of Peru, Kaplan [37] found convincing evidence that among hunter-
gatherers, resources flow from older to younger generations and not the other
way around. These tribes all had very high average fertility (about 8 births
per woman), but in each case, children consumed more food than they caught
from birth until age 18. Grandparents continued to work hard to support their
grandchildren and produced more than they ate. At almost no time in their
adult lives, did adults produce less than they consumed. When people became
too old and frail to work, death followed quickly. Suicide and euthanasia of the
enfeebled were frequently reported.
Although the evidence indicates that hunter-gatherers do not behave in a
way consistent with Caldwell's hypothesis, there remains the possibility that
investment in children is financially profitable in peasant agricultural societies.
As Yean-Ju Lee, William Parish and Robert Willis [42] point out, the presence
of positive net flows from prime-age adults to their elderly parents would not
in itself be sufficient to vindicate Caldwell's hypothesis. For children to be a
profitable economic investment, it would have to be that the amount returned to
elderly parents would be enough to repay the investment made in their children
when they are small and if the parents have access to borrowing and lending
markets or can buy and sell land, a present value calculation should be made,
discounting future returns. The evidence available suggests that this is not the
case. Eva Mueller [48] surveyed several studies of consumption and output of
peasants and their children over the life cycle and concluded that
"Children have negative economic value in peasant agriculture.
Up to the time that they become parents themselves, children con-
sume more than they produce. "
Thus any economic gain from having children would have to come in the form
of a long term investment in the child's obligation to support the parent in her
5
Fieldworkers walked with the male hunters on their hunting expeditions and followed the
female gatherers. They weighed all of the food acquired by each individual and converted their
measurements to calories. They also observed the distribution of food among the population.
Thus they were able to measure output and consumption of each man, woman and child.
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old age. Calculations by Mueller [48] and by Goran Ohlin [51] indicate that a
parent who gave birth at age 20 and supported a child from age 1 to age 15
would receive a monetary rate of return of less than 1% on her investment if
she retired at age 60 and was supported by the child until age 85 at the level of
living that is normal for old people in peasant societies. When the probability
that either parent or child may die before the parent reaches 85 years of age
is accounted for, the rate of return becomes negative. In a peasant society,
where landownership is possible and where there are markets for borrowing
and lending, such low rates of return are not likely to be acceptable on purely
financial grounds.
Ronald Lee and Timothy Miller [41] construct detailed estimates of inter-
generational wealth flows in the United States in the 1980's, using data from
the 1987 Consumer Expenditure Survey and other sources. The Consumer Ex-
penditure Survey reports interhousehold gifts and transfers. According to Lee
and Miller
"The gross flows are overwhelmingly downward, from older ages
to younger ones. Young households just starting out make no trans-
fers at all, and receive a considerable amount-nearly a thousand
dollars a year. ... As couples age, and their children become bet-
ter established, fewer transfers are made. Somewhat surprisingly,
however, there is no increase in transfers received; on the contrary,
transfer receipts diminish steadily at older ages."
Lee and Miller calculate that the average net payments in gifts and bequests
from the parental generation to their children amount to about $25,000 per
child.
9 In addition, they estimate average child-rearing costs at $81,000 per
child.
Overall, the evidence seems strongly consistent with the volutionary view
as expressed by Kaplan. Over the course of a lifetime, resources tend mainly to
flow from the old to the young and not the other way around.
2.3 Economic Support of the Aged
In the hunter-gatherer societies studied by Kaplan, the downward flow of re-
sources takes an extreme form. Not only do children cost more than they return,
but there is never a substantial period of their lives when old people consume
more than they produce.
In Western industrial countries, most people have a long interval at the end
of their lives when they consume more than they produce. As Lee and Miller (41]
point out, the elderly are typically not supported by gifts from their children,
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To calculate net payments, they subtracted payments from children to parents from gifts
in the other direction. Since payments from children to parents are usually made years later
than payments than payments from parents to children, these figures are likely to understate
the flow from parent to child measured in present value terms.
but rather by social security payments and by their own savings and private
pension plans.
In many traditional societies [18] [16] there appear to be strong cultural
norms that urge children to support their parents in their old age. Robert Lucas
and Oded Stark [44] emphasize the importance in traditional African societies
of remittances sent to their home families by grown children who have left
home to work in urban areas. The existence of substantial remittances does not
necessarily represent a flow of resources from the younger to the older generation.
It may be that the remittances represent a "helpers-at-the-nest" effect, where
the resources collected from older siblings are used to support younger siblings
and other young kinfolk. Using data from a survey of Taiwanese households,
Lee, Parish and Willis [42] found evidence of a widespread pattern of support
payments to elders from their adult sons and daughters.
"...financial support, including both cash and in-kind gifts, con-
tinued in an upward direction, from adult children to parents. Whether
son or daughter, most married children gave financial gifts to parents
while few received gifts in return."
The experience of the generations studied by these authors is unusual in the
sense that the current generation of adult children in Taiwan is far wealthier on
average than their parents. Per capita income in Taiwan increased more than
fivefold between 1961 and 1986.
It has been suggested [18] [6] that adults may support their parents in order
to imprint a corresponding behavior pattern on their own children. Thus the
more an adult contributes to his aged parents, the more he can expect his
children to contribute to him in his old age. The biblical statement of the
Fourth Commandment (Exodus 20:12) suggests that the ancient Hebrews may
have viewed filial obligation in such a recursive way:
"Honor thy father and thy mother that thy days may be long
upon the land..."
The clause "that thy days may be long upon the land" seems to indicate
that the reason to treat your parents well is that the treatment you accord to
them will ultimately be accorded to you.
It would be problematic to assume that the current generation consciously
chooses the way it treats its parents while its offspring make no such choice
but simply copy their parents. Bergstrom and Stark resolve this difficulty by
suggesting that in equilibrium a child might copy its parents' actions, but with
some probability the child makes an independent choice based on its own self-
interest.
10 In this environment, imitators take the same actions as some an-
cestral chooser, so that everyone's behavior will be the same as the optimizing
1
0Rogers (54) offers an interesting model to explain why it might be that equilibrium is
polymorphic, with some copiers and some independent choosers.
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choice for a chooser who is aware that her actions may be copied by her children.
An adult who invests in the well-being of her parents is making a risky invest-
ment which will not be returned if her offspring turn out to be choosers. An
chooser decides whether to support her elderly parents or to ignore the parent
and invest her money in property which she can exchange for income when she
herself is old. Whether it is financially advantageous to care for the parents
depends on the riskiness of imprinting a sense of obligation on one's children
relative to the riskiness of buying financial assets.
While we can construct consistent models in which parental imprinting and
social pressure cause adults to support their elderly parents, the cultural forces
in favor of such support must somehow overcome significant pressure from nat-
ural selection. If behavior were genetically hard-wired, a gene that led people
to spend resources on an elderly relative when these resources could have been
used to produce an extra surviving child would eventually be eliminated by
genes for maximizing the number of surviving descendants. The same problem
arises if either genetic or cultural evolution selects preferences. Aged people
who are inclined to the view "I don't want to be a burden on my children and
grandchildren" and act on this view will eventually have more descendants than
those who try to command resources at the expense of the reproductive success
of their offspring. Therefore if preferences tend to be vertically transmitted,
we should expect selection for individuals who want to pass resources to their
descendants during almost all of their entire lives. Substantial flows of resource
from young to old might be observed if there are is strong horizontal transmis-
sion of cultural views or it might be observed as a "disequilibrium outcome" in
societies where recent changes in medical technology have increased the survival
of enfeebled elders.
3 Non-monogamous Household Structures
For the most part, economic analyses of the household have dealt either with
single-person households or with monogamous couples and their children. An
important exception is Gary Becker's Treatise on the Family, which devotes a
chapter to polygamy in marriage markets. It might be thought that Becker's
discussion of polygamy is simply a virtuoso exercise in the economics of exotica.
More careful consideration suggests that the study of non-monogamous mating
relationships may be truly fundamental. It is, in itself, of great interest to
investigate the workings of marital institutions in other societies. Moreover, on
closer inspection, our own society is far from universally monogamous and, as
statistics indicate, is rapidly becoming much less monogamous.
Unwed parenthood is no longer rare. In the United States in 1960, only 5%
of all births occurred out of wedlock." In 1990, more than 25% of births were
SThestatistics cited here come from a review of demographic trends in marriage, divorce
to unwed parents.'
2 
The proportion of all children who live in single-parent,
mother-only households has risen from 8% in 1960 to 23% in 1990. For Black
Americans, the statistics are even more dramatic. In 1990, two-thirds of births
were out of wedlock and more than half of all children live in single-parent
households. Not only has unwed parenthood become common, but divorce
rates more than doubled between 1960 and 1990. About 20% of all marriages
are dissolved within the first five years of marriage. Some estimates have it
that nearly two-thirds of all first marriages will be dissolved within 40 years.
In 1979, roughly one-third of all marriages involved at least one previously
marriaged person.
According to Da Vonza and Rahman, men who divorce are three times more
likely to remarry than women. Divorced women who have children are 25%
less likely to remarry than those without children. The asymmetry between the
remarriage prospects of men and women means that it is more likely for men
to have more than one wife over the course of their lives than for women to
have more than one husband. Moreover, it is more common for divorced men to
remarry and have children by his new wife than for women to have children in
remarriages. This assymmetry has led some anthropologists [43] [28] to describe
current marriage patterns in the United States as "serial polygyny."
3.1 Divorce and Out-of-Wedlock Parenthood
In recent years, there have been several interesting contributions to the eco-
nomics of divorce and child support.1
3 
Yoram Weiss and Robert Willis [66] [67]
model child-support private provision of public goods as a problem in the pri-
vate provision of public goods. Both parents care about the well-being of the
child. In a household where the mother and father live together it is possible
for each to monitor the contributions of the other and the outcome of this "re-
peated game" is expected to be an amount of child care that is close to Pareto
optimal. But if the parents do not live together, they lose the ability to observe
each others' contributions. In this case they will reach a non-cooperative equi-
librium in which the amount of resources contributed to childcare is typically
suboptimal.
If the economics of child support by divorced couples is in its youth, the
economics of out-of-wedlock births is in its infancy. The most prominent pro-
genitor in this area seems to be Robert Willis. [68] Willis addresses the question
of how unwed parenthood might come to prevail in a population, even though
marriage would allow significant gains from coordination of parenting effort. His
proposed explanation depends on their being an excess of marriageable women
and fertility statistics by Da Vonza and Rahman. [21]12
About 30% of unwed parents in 1990 were cohabiting couples many of whom maintain
stable monogamous marriages.
"3Pioneering work was done by Becker, Landes, and Michael (2). A good recent survey of
work on the economics of divorce is Weiss (65]
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over marriageable men. The African-American population in the United States
displays exactly such a disparity. Willis builds a model based on observations
of the sociologist, William Julius Wilson, [69] who identifies the pool of "mar-
riageable black males" as those who are currently employed. Wilson found that
in 1980, the ratio of marriageable black males aged 20-44 to black females aged
20-44 was about .56 in the Northeast and North Central states of the U.S. (In
1960, this ratio was about .67.) The corresponding ratio of marriageable white
males to white females was about .85.
- The Willis model has an equilibrium in which men choose between monoga-
mous marriage and remaining single while fathering children by several women.
Monogamous men are confined to a single mate, but are able to reach more
efficient agreements with their wives about child care. Unmarried fathers are
able to father children by more than one woman, but the children of these re-
lationships are less likely to be well cared for. In this model, the fraction of the
male population who marry is determined by the condition that in equilibrium
married and unmarried males are equally well off. Willis defines a threshold
number of partners P such that the strategy of unmarried fatherhood is as at-
tractive as monogamy if and only if an unmarried male can expect to have P
female sexual partners.
With this model, Willis finds a simple solution for the equilibrium fraction
of males who marry monogamously. The algebra is as follows: Let W be the
number of marriageable females, let aW be the number of marriageable males
(where it is assumed that cs < 1), and let M be the number of monogamous
marriages. Then the number of unmarried women is W - M and the number
of unmarried men is oW - Al. Assuming that all of the unmarried women and
men form partnerships, the average number of partners per unmarried men will
be at the equilibrium level P only if W - M = P(aW - M). Rearranging terms
in this equation, we find that the fraction of all women who marry is
M aP- 1
W _P - 1
and the fraction of all men who marry is
M _ aP-1
cW ~a(P - 1)
Each of these expressions is seen to be an increasing function of a and also
an increasing function of P. Therefore, in the Willis model, the fraction of
members of either sex who maintain monogamous marriages will be smaller:
(i) the lower is the ratio of the number of marriageable men to the number of
marriageable women (ii) the smaller the threshold number of relationships P
needed to induce a man to stay unmarried.
3.2 Polygamous Marriages
The term polygamy encompasses all marital arrangements where the conjugal
group includes at least three persons, with at least one person of each sex. Al-
though polygamous marriage is rare in the United States and Western Europe,
it is a very common mode of family organization around the world.
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Polygyny,
where some men have more than one wife, is prevalent in 850 of the 1170 soci-
eties recorded in Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas. Officially recognized polyandry,
where some women have more than one husband is currently prevalent in only
a few societies [35], though it appears to have been considerably more common
in earlier times. [53] The practice of polygynandry or conjoint marriage, where
the conjugal group includes two or more persons of each sex is also found in
some societies. [53] [23]
Polygyny and Bridewealth
In polygynous societies that have well-defined property rights in land and cattle,
it is usual for brides to command a positive price. Anthropologists refer to this
price as brindewealth. According to anthropologists Steven Gaulin and James
Boster [27] "Bridewealth is common and dowry is rare." They report that of
the 1267 societies recorded in Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas, 2/3 have positive
bride prices, while only about 3% have dowries. Bridewealth is paid by the
groom and his relatives to the bride's male relatives. Dowry, in contrast, is
a payment from the bride's family to the groom and/or his relatives on the
occasion of a marriage. 15
Because of the nature of sexual reproduction it is possible for a male who
commands a large amount of material resources to greatly increase his fertility
by having multiple wives. On the other hand, holding constant the material
resources available, a female gains little fertility from an additional husband
and loses only a small amount of fertility by sharing a husband with co-wives.
Bergstrom [3] builds a formal model of polygynous marriage in which parents
seek to maximize the number of their surviving grandchildren. In this model,
the only scarce resources in the production of children turn out to be women
of reproductive age and material resources. Where polygyny is allowed, there
would be excess demand for women without a positive bride price. In market
equilibrium with a positive bride price, men must choose between allocating
additional resources to the care and feeding of their current wife or wives and
the purchase and support of an additional wife. In this model, wealthy men
i"Anthropologists like to point out that societies that are strictly monogamous with respect
to marriage are often highly polygynous with respect to mating. See Robin Fox [24], Laura
Betzig [7], and Bergstrom (4) for discussions of societies with monogamous marriage and
poygnous mating.
isJack Goody 131] points out that dowry is not the same as a "negative bride price" since
dowry goes to the newly formed couple while bridewealth goes to the bride's male relatives.
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will have more wives than poor men, but the amount of resources supplied to a
woman and her children is independent of her husband's wealth.'
Therefore there is no incentive for a woman or her relatives to seek to mate
her with a wealthy man and wealthy men have to pay the same price for a bride
as poorer men. In this model, polygyny tends to equalize the physical well-being
and reproductive success of women, while amplifying the effects of wealth on
the reproductive success of men.
The broad outlines of this model appear to fit many polygynous African so-
cieties. (See for example [321, [29], [39], and [33]. ) Monique Borgerhoff Mulder,
[14],[11],[12], and [13] has conducted a remarkably detailed anthropological field
study of the Kipsigis, a polygynous East-African tribe who engage in agricul-
ture and herding.'
7 
Borgerhoff Mulder [14] reports that in a simple regression
analysis, an extra wife adds about 6.5 children to a man's fertility, while sharing
her husband with an additional co-wife reduces a woman's fertility by about -.5
children. Using cross-sectional data from her study of the Kipsigis, Borgerhoff
Mulder, [11] explored the determinants of bridewealth. She found that the av-
erage cost of a bride was about 1/3 of the wealth of an average household. The
price paid for a bride depended positively on variables related to her health and
fertility'
8 
but did not depend on differences in the wealth of the bride's and
groom's family. In a subsequent study [13] Borgerhoff Mulder showed that in
any year, the males most likely to attract additional wives were those who could
provide the most resources (measured in acres of land) per wife. The number
of wives that men had was roughly proportional to the number of acres of land
that they owned with larger landowners having slightly fewer wives per acre
than smaller landholders. [12]
Becker suggested that women would be better off in a society that allows
polygyny than in a society with compulsory monogamy. He reasoned that re-
laxing the constraint that a man can have only one wife would shift the demand
schedule for wives upward, leading to higher bride prices with polygyny than
with monogamy. The claim that polygyny leads to high bride prices is theo-
retically compelling and is consistent with most anthropological field studies.
But it does not follow that high bride prices imply welfare gains for females.
The theory suggests, and field studies confirm that when "property rights" to
an unmarried female lie with her family, her family will use the proceeds from
'°The conclusions of this model turn out to be very similar to conclusions reached by
biologistsestudying polygyny among birds and mammals. G. Orians 1521 calls this the polygyny
threshold model. Interestingly, in the polygyny threshold model, females are allocated to males
in proportion to the resources that the males control, not by a price mechanism but by female
choice. In these species, females account for the amount of resources controlled by a male and
the number of other females with whom they would have to share these resources in choosing
the mate who can supply them with the most resources.t
'These works contains a great deal of information on the economics and demography of
the Kipsigis and are likely to be of interest to many economists.
'sPerhaps married readers will not be surprised to learn that the price paid for a bride was
also higher, the greater the distance between parents' residence and her husband's residence.
selling their daughter to purchase wives for her male siblings rather than to raise
her standard of living.
Monogamy, Dowries, and Primogeniture
Gaulin and Boster [27] find that 3/4 of the societies recorded in Murdoch's Atlas
as having dowries are monogamous with a high degree of economic stratification.'
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In a monogamous society, the wife and children of a wealthy man are more likely
to be well cared for than the wife and children of a poor man. Therefore parents
who want to increase the number of their descendants would prefer that their
daughters married rich men. In this environment, the scarce resource "a rich
husband" will attract a positive price.
Laura Betzig [8] argues that most of the historical examples of stratified
societies with monogamous marriage, were also characterized by highly polygy-
nous mating. For the nobility, marriage was an economic relationship in which
the monogamously married wife was entitled to bear the only child or children
to inherit a major portion of the nobleman's estate. Most of these societies
practiced primogeniture, with the great bulk of the estate going to the oldest
son born to the nobleman and his wife. There was a sexual double standard in
which the wives of noblemen were expected to remain faithful to their husbands,
but the husbands openly maintained sexual liasons with numerous mistresses,
concubines, and household servants. The historian, Lawrence Stone [61] offers
vivid descriptions of the sexual behavior of the late medieval and early modern
English nobility Parents were willing to pay a large dowries for their daughters
to become the wives of noblemen. Although their daughter's own fertility is
only slightly improved by marriage to a nobleman, her descendants are likely
to be numerous because, given the great wealth of the nobility and the double
standard of sexual fidelity, her firstborn son is likely to father many children.
For the British aristocracy in the late medieval and early modern periods,
very good demographic and economic data and detailed descriptions of inheri-
tance practices can be found. Bergstrom [4] builds a formal model of a stratified
society with monogamy and primogeniture similar to that described by Betzig.
He uses historical data on the British aristocracyto estimate the parameters
of his model and to test the hypothesis that the nobility were acting so as to
maximize their reproductive success.
Polyandry
Although far less common than polygyny or monogamy, several societies with
polyandrous marriage structures have been studied by ethnologists. In these so-
cieties, fraternal polyandry was the usual pattern. A woman would be married
"*Gaulin and Boster also find that according to Murdoch's classification, societies with




to two or more brothers, who in principle are allocated equal sexual access to
their joint wife. Two important sources of information on polyandry are studies
by Prince Peter of Greece and Denmark, [53) who interviewed polyandrous fam-
ilies in Ceylon, Kerala, Madras and Tibet and by Melvyn Goldstein, [30] who
interviewed a large number of refugees from central Tibet, who had made their
way to northern India. William Durham [23] presents a thorough discussion of
the anthropological literature on Tibetan polyandry and elaborates on theories
of polyandry that were proposed by Prince Peter and by Goldstein.
According to Durham, one finds the "greatest diversity of socially sanctioned
marriage customs known to anthropology" among the Tibetan-speaking peoples.
Observed marital forms include monogamy, polygyny, polyandry, and polygy-
nandry. The landless serfs, the du-jong, almost always married monogamously.
It is among the landed serfs, the thongpa, that great diversity of marital cus-
toms is found. The thongpa lived in family units that controlled 20 to 300 acres
of land to which they had permanent hereditary rights. Goldstein proposed
that the entire spectrum of marital forms observed among the thongpa can be
explained as an application of two fundamental social principles, 1) Partible
patrilineal inheritance. In families that had male offspring, inheritance was in
principle divided equally among them. In families that had no sons, inheritance
was passed to a daughter. 2) The monomarital principle. In each generation
of a thongpa family, the conjugal group must contain one and only one fertile
woman.
In accordance with these principles, male thongpa who had no brothers
almost always married monogamously. In families with two sons, the brothers
almost always shared a single wife. Groups of three brothers sharing a wife
were common, and larger groups of brothers sharing a wife were also found.
But Goldstein reported that Tibetans believe that as the number of brothers
sharing a wife increases, fraternal harmony becomes more difficult to maintain.
Accordingly, when there are several brothers, some may become celibate monks
or may be sent out as an adoptive bridegroom to a family with no male children.
If the first wife of a marriage turns out to be infertile, then a second wife,
often a sister of the first wife, will be brought to the marriage. This accounts
for the occasional instances of polygyny and of polygynandry observed among
the thongpa. In families where there are daughters but no sons, the estate will
pass to one of the daughters, who marries monogamously.
In these societies, the monomarital principle of one fertile woman per gen-
eration, per estate regulates fertility and hence controls the family's land-labor
ratio. Brothers who would be unable to sustain independent families if they
divided the land and each had a wife and children, are able to support one wife
and her offspring by working together on the land.
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0Since with polyandry, more men marry than women, in the absence of infanticide there
will typically be left over women who do not find mates. Female infanticide does not appear to
be common among the polyandrous people of Kerala or Tibet. Unmarried women frequently
work on the farm along with their brothers.
According to Durham, there is evidence that the institution of fraternal
polyandry has persisted among the Tibetans for at least 1300 years. Durham
argues that this persistence requires explanation and he seeks an explanation
in the theory of cultural evolution. Durham maintains that the "marital ideol-
ogy had, by virtue of its consequences undek local conditions, net reproductive
benefit for thongpa parents, and ... that tie marriage beliefs themselves had
been preserved within the cultural system primarily as a result of a thongpa
preference for them because of their consequences."
Adherence to the monomarital principle is not enforced by law, but accord-
ing to the thongpa is a conscious choice, based on the belief that partitioning
the family estates would lead to devastating hardship for future generations.
Durham suggests that the monomarital principle appears to be supported both
by cultural evolution both through vertical transmission. He presents evidence
that families that partition their lands between more than one conjugal group
will produce more children in the first generation, but that in two or three gen-
erations, the number of surviving descendants will be smaller than the number
of descendants of families who adhered to the monomarital principle. Thus if
children adopt the marital principles of their parents, we would expect the mono-
marital principle to prevail. There is also evidence that horizontal transmission
also supports the monomarital principle. Within the society, there has been
recurrent experimentation with partitioning of family estates. In interviews,
Tibetans describe recent instances of "deviant" behavior as having resulted in
devastation for one or more heirs. They also cite the extreme poverty of the
neighboring Nepalese communities who do not practice polyandry as evidence
of the evils of partitioning.
Matriarchal Societies
The Nayar of India are a matriarchal society, who had particularly interest-
ing marriage customs.
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At any one time, women would maintain formally-
recognized sexual relationships with between three and twelve "husbands". When
a woman became pregnant, one of the husbands who might possibly be the father
had to acknowledge paternity. The putative father, however, had no obligation
to the child.
Men were expected to give money to their maternal household for the support
of their sisters. A husband normally visited a wife after eating supper at his
mother's house, and left the wife's residence before breakfast. For a man to
withhold money from hi, maternal family and give the money to a wife or to
support his biological child was a gross violation of the social norm. Children
belonged to the mother's household and were supported and cared for by child's
21Descriptions of Nayar marriage customs, are found in works of Prince Peter [53) and
Kathleen Gough 159), and William Irons (361. The ancient marriage customs have largely
eroded in modern times, but much information is available from written accounts by various
writers from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries.
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mother, maternal grandmother, and maternal uncles. Children were aware of
their declared fathers and had occasional dealings with them, but they had much
more frequent encounters with their mothers' brothers. A woman's brothers
were charged with disciplining her children and with attending to the education
of her sons.
In considering the stability of Nayar institutions under cultural evolution,
one must ask whether a "deviant" social norm that asks men to give money to
their wives and wives' children rather than to their sisters and sisters' children
would be able to invade a population of Nayars who followed the usual norm. If
this behavior were genetically determined, the answer would depend on whether,
on average, men are more closely related to their sisters' children or to their
wives' children. If in every generation, there is a constant probability p that a
man is the father of his wife's child, there is a paternity threshold probability pe
such that a man will be more closely related to his sister's children than to his
wife's children if and only if p < pt. Kurland [40] shows how to calculate the
paternity threshold. The degree of relatedness of a man to his wife's children is
p/2. A man and his sister share the same mother, but the probability that they
share the same father is only p
2
. Therefore the expected degree of relatedness
between a man and his sister is (1 +p2 )/4 and the expected degree of relatedness
between a man and his sister's child is (1 + p2)/8.22 Therefore the paternity
threshold is a solution to the quadratic equation p/2 = (1+p2 )/8 This equation
has only one positive root, which is pt = .268. Thus the genes of men who give
resources to their sisters rather than to their wives will eventually dominate the
population if and only if the probability that a man is the father of his wife's
children exceeds .268.
If marital behavior is culturally determined, the calculations are different,
but a similar principle applies. If boys learn their behavior from the males with
whom they associate most closely, then in Nayar society, we notice that boys
are more strongly influenced by the behavior of their maternal uncles than by
the behavior of their mothers' husbands. If a deviant man contributed money
to a wife rather than to his sisters, then that man's wife would on average
have more children and his sisters would have fewer children than would be the
case in a normal family. Even if his wife's children are more closely related to
him genetically than his sisters' children, his cultural influence is likely to be
stronger on the nephews and nieces whom he shortchanged than on the progeny
that he enriched. His relatively numerous genetic children are likely to adopt
the cultural practices of his traditionalist brothers in law, while the people most
likely to copy his behavior will be the less numerous children of his sisters.
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Here we are assuming that a man's wife's other lovers are not close relatives of the man.
In the case, for example, of fraternal polyandry, the relationship between a man and his wife's
children is closer, because if the child is not his, it is his brother's.
4 Choosing Your Bed and Lying In It
Proposing marriage, an eager suitor may promise a lifetime of devoted ser':
to the whims of his beloved. But a sensible young woman, even if she ha.,..
studied game theory, is likely to be skeptical. She is more likely to base r
expectations about marriage on what knows of the way her mother and om ier
married female acquaintances have fared, than on her suitor's flattering, but
unenforceable promises.
It is not possible to write a prenuptial marriage contract that legally binds
the new couple to a detailed program of behavior through the course of their
marriage. Most of the important decisions to be made by the couple must be
resolved as they arise, after marriage. In a satisfactory theory of courtship and
mating, potential partners must anticipate that their well-being after marriage,
will depend on the outcome of postnuptial bargaining. Conversely, since one's
bargaining power within a marriage may depend on the threat of exercising the
"outside option" of divorcing and reentering the marriage market, a satisfactory
theory of bargaining within marriage should include a theory of courtship and
mating.
4.1 Cooperative Nash Bargaining Solutions
The pioneering work on the theory of household bargaining was done by Marilyn
Manser and Murray Brown [46] and Marjorie McElroy and Mary Horney [47],
who studied household decision making under the Nash cooperative bargaining
model. In these papers, a marriage is modelled as a static bilateral monopoly.
A married couple can either remain married or they can divorce and live singly.
There is a convex utility possibility set S containing all utility distributions
(U, U2) that could possibly be achieved if they remain married. The utility
of person i if he or she divorces and lives singly is given by V. It is assumed
that there are potential gains to marriage, which means that there are util-
ity distributions (U1, U2) in S that strictly dominate the utility distribution
(Vi, V2). These papers propose that the outcome in a marriage will be the
symmetric Nash bargaining solution where the "threat point" is dissolution of
the marriage with both persons choosing to live singly. According to the Nash
bargaining theory, the outcome in this household will be the utility distribu' on
(U1 , Uz) that maximizes (U1 - V)(U2 - V2) on the utility possibility set S.-2 in
this theory the outcome in a marriage is completely determined by the u .
possibility set and by the position of the threat point, (V1, V2). This th'
has the interesting prediction that social changes that affect the utility of be
single will affect the distribution of utility within the household and hence m:+
change household spending patterns, even if they have no effect on the budg,
2 3
This expression is sometimes known as the Nash product. John Nash (491 proposed a sr
of axioms for resolution of static two-person bargaining games such that the only outcomes
that satisfy the axioms maximize the Nash product on the utility possibility set.
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of the household, while changes in the apparent distribution of earned income
within the household will have no effect on the distribution of utility in the
household if they do not change the threat point from being single.
Shelly Lundberg and Robert Pollak (45] propose an alternative Nash bar-
gaining model. They suggest that for many marriages the relevant threat point
for the Nash bargaining solution should be not divorce, but an "uncooperative
marriage" in which spouses would revert a "division of labor based on socially
recognized and sanctioned gender roles." Lundberg and Pollak suggest that with
their model, if government child-allowances are paid to mothers rather than to
fathers in two-parent households, this threat point will shift in the mothers' fa-
vor. Accordingly, the outcomes of cooperative bargaining within households are
likely to be more favorable to women. By contrast, in the divorce-threat model,
a change in who receives the welfare payments when the couple is together will
have no effect on the distribution of utilities if there is no change in who gets
these payments in the event of a divorce.
4.2 Noncooperative Bargaining Theory and Outside Op-
tions
Should the threat point be divorce as suggested by Mansur, Brown, McElroy
and Horney? Should it be an uncooperative marriage as suggested by Lundberg
and Pollak? Will the threat point depend on whether either party can end
the marriage or whether mutual consent or a court decree is required to end
the marriage? Nash's axioms for the cooperative bargaining solution give us no
direct guidance about the appropriate threat points for bargaining in a marriage.
Recent work on the noncooperative foundations of bargaining theory not only
offers a more convincing foundation for the Nash bargaining solution, but also
yields useful insight into the appropriate choice of threat points.
Ariel Rubinstein (58] developed an extensive-form, multi-period bargaining
game for two agents in which a cake is to be partitioned only after the players
reach agreement. Players alternate in proposing how to divide the cake with one
time period elapsing between each offer. Each agent i is impatient, discounting
future utility by a factor b; < 1, so that the utility to player i of receiving w
units of cake in period t is woJ. Rubinstein proved that in the limit as the
time between proposals becomes small, the only subgame perfect equilibrium is
for the cake to be divided in the first period with player i's share of the cake
being a; = 1;/(6 + 62). More generally, if agent i's utility from receiving w;
units of cake in period i is u;(w;)b; where u1 is a concave function, then the
only perfect equilibrium is the allocation that maximizes the "generalized Nash
product", ui' u2' on the utility possibility set {(u,(w), u2(1 - w)) 10 < w < 1.
In case the two agents have equal discount rates, this outcome is the same as
the symmetric Nash equilibrium where the threat point is (0, 0).
Ken Binmore (10] extended the Rubinstein model to the case where each of
the bargaining agents has access to an "outside option". Binmore's model is like
the Rubinstein model, except that each agent i has the option of breaking off
negotiations at any time and receiving a payoff of m1 units of cake, in which case
the other player receives no cake. Given that the outcome in the game without
outside options is the same as the Nash cooperative equilibrium with threat
point (0,0), one might conjecture that the effect of the outside options would
be to move the threat point to (Mi, m2). (If negative values of mi are considered,
this conjecture might be amended to (max{0, mi), max{0, m2}). Binmore shows
that this is not the answer. The only subgame perfect equilibrium for the game
with outside options is an agreement in the first period on the utility distribution
(u1, u2) that maximizes the Nash product u* u 4 on the utility possibility set
{u 1(w), u2(1 - w)|0 < w < 1} subject to the constraint that u; i> m; for each i.
In general, this solution is not the same as maximizing (u1 - mi)* (u2 - m2)*a
on the utility possibility set, which would be the outcome of shifting the threat
point to (ml, m2).
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4.3 Noncooperative Bargaining Theory and Marriage
To many persons with marital experience, it seems unlikely that couples re-
solve disagreements about ordinary household matters by negotiating under the
pressure of divorce threats. If one spouse proposes a resolution to a household
dispute and the other does not agree, the expected outcome is not a divorce.
A more likely outcome is harsh words and burnt toast until the next offer is
made. If the couple were to persist forever in inflicting small punishments upon
each other, it might well be that the outcome would be worse for one or both
of them than a divorce. But divorce imposes large irrevocable costs on both
parties, while a bargaining impasse need last only as long as the time between
a rejected offer and acceptance of a counteroffer.
The Rubinstein-Binmore model, as applied to marriage lends formal support
to these speculations. This model concludes that so long as the gains from
marriage are divided in such a way that both parties are better off being married
than being divorced, a divorce threat is not credible. Instead, the relevant threat
is delayed agreement and burnt toast, followed by a counterproposal. Here we
will explain the workings of the Rubinstein-Binmore model as applied to a highly
simplified model of a household.
Consider a married couple who expect to live forever in a stationary environ-
ment. Assume that each spouse discounts future utility by the same per-period
discount factor 6 and that in every time period, the utility possibility frontier is
the simplex {(uh, u.)|us+u. = 1), where ut and uw are the utilities of husband
and wife respectively. Each spouse has an intertemporal utility function of the
2 4
Binmore. Shaked, and Sutton 191 tested this theory with a laboratory experiment in which
subjects played a Rubinstein bargaining game with outside options. Behavior in this game
was better predicted by Binmore's model than by the competing model in which the outside
option is the threat point.
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form F**_ u,6r. In any period where they remain married, but do not reach
agreement, the husband will get a utility of b and the wife will get a utility of
be, where bh + b, < 1. If either person asks for a divorce, they will divorce and
the husband will get a utility of ma forever and the wife will get a utility of mw
forever, where ma + m, < 1. 2s
The spouses alternate in offering feasible utility distributions. For concrete-
ness, let us suppose that the wife gets to make the first offer and that she
proposes a utility distribution (uh, u.) > (mh, mw). The husband could either
accept the offer, refuse the offer and make a counteroffer, or refuse the offer and
ask for a divorce. If the husband accepts the offer, then the distribution of util-
ity in the household will (u,, u.) and will remain the same in every subsequent
period unless in some future period the husband changes his mind and decides
to reject his wife's outstanding offer of (ua, u,). Since this is a stationary model,
if the husband accepts the offer in the first period, he will continue to accept it
in all subsequent periods. If the husband refuses the offer and asks for a divorce,
he will get a utility flow of ml < uh in all future periods. Therefore, if the only
way to refuse an offer were to ask for a divorce, the wife could extract all of the
gains from marriage by offering the husband a utility that is just equal to his
utility from being divorced."s But the husband has the additional alternative
of refusing the wife's offer and making a counteroffer in the next period. In
equilibrium, it must be the case that the husband can not do better by refusing
the offer and waiting for his own turn to make a counteroffer. Since the wife will
want to make the smallest offer that the husband will accept, it must be that
in equilibrium, the wife offers terms that leave the husband indifferent between
accepting immediately and making a counteroffer. If the divorce threat is not
credible for either spouse, this process has a unique equilibrium in which the
wife gets b,. plus the fractionIT of the total gain 1 - ba - bw from agreement
and the husband gets bh plus the fraction 4h of the gains 1 - bh - b,...2 Thus
if the wife gets to make the first offer, the equilibrium is
- , w- + (1 - bh - bw) (10- bti- b.)
If u,, > n, and i. > in,,, then the divorce threat is not credible for either
spouse and the solution will be (ci,,w). If i < mi, then the divorce threat
will be relevant for person i, and as Binmore observes, the only equilibrium
25 
A more realistic model would allow the possibility that divorced personscan remarry with
some probability at some interval of time after divorcing. While it would be worthwhile to
develop the model in this direction, it appears that the qualitative conclusions would be little
different from the model sketched here2
We follow the convention in the principal-agent literature, by assuming that if the agent
is offered a deal in which he is just indifferent between two options, he will take the one that
the principal wants him to take. This saves mathematical clutter that would arise if we had
the principal offer the agent a tiny bit more for taking the desired option.
TIn the Appendix, we present a simple algebraic proof of this proposition. (This proof is
not new. A similar argument can be found in 110).
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outcome is one in which person i gets utility mi and his partner gets utility
1 - i.
If the time between offer and counteroffer is small, then the discount rate
for waiting one period is close to 0, so that 6 is close to 1. In the limit as 6
approaches 1, if divorce threat is not relevant, then the gains from cooperative
rather than noncooperative marriage will be divided nearly equally. Thus in the
limit as the time between offer and counteroffer becomes small, the equilibrium
approaches one of the following three cases.
a Case i. Divorce threats are not credible. If b, + (1 -5b, - bm)/2 > ma and
b,,,-+(1 - bh - b6)/2 > mw, then the outcome is (Gh, 0.) = bt, + (I -- b -
b.)/2, b.+(1-bh -b.)/2. The geometry of Case i is illustrated in Figure 1.
The point (a, s.) is the point on the simplex that splits the gains above
(bh, b.) equally. In the example shown here, noncooperative marriage for a
single period is worse for the husband (and better for the wife) than being
divorced for a single period, but the bargained equilibrium (nh, s) is
better for both spouses than divorce. It is not difficult to see that it would
be possible to construct examples that fall into Case i where a single period
of noncooperative marriage is worse for both spouses (or better for both
spouses) than a single period of divorce, but where the equilibrium from
the noncooperative threat point is better for both spouses than divorce.
Figure 1-Household Bargaining Equilibrium
Case (I), Divorce threat is not binding
* Case ii. Divorce threat is credible for the husband, but not for the wife.
This happens if bh + (1- bh - b.,)/2 < ma.In this case the solution is ua =
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mh and u,, = I- m > m,,. This case is illustrated in Figure 2. In Case ii,
not only is noncooperative marriage worse for the husband than divorce,
but the equilibrium found taking noncooperative equilibrium as a threat
point is worse for the husband than divorce. In this case, equilibrium is the
outcome where the husband is indifferent between divorce and marriage
and the wife has utility I - mh.
Fgure 2--Household Bargaining Equilibrium
case(ii). Doioc ltramid s so
the divorce-threat bargaining models. In this case, one partner enjoys all of the
surplus and the other is indifferent between being divorced and being single.
To some observers, this model's stately minuet of offer and counteroffer
may seem not to reflect the realities of domestic conflict. But Rubinstein's
canonical bargaining model can be much relaxed in the direction of realism
without altering the main results. Binmore shows that qualitatively similar
results obtain when the length of time between offers and the person whose
turn it is to make the next offer are randomly determined after every refusal. It
is also a straightforward matter to add a constant probability of death for each
partner without seriously changing the model. On the other hand, stationarity
of the model seems to be necessary for Rubinstein's beautifully simple result.
This stationarity is lacking in a model where children grow up and leave the
family and where the probability of death increases with age. It would be useful
to know more about the robustness of the Rubinstein results to more realistic
models of the family. For the time being, Rubinstein's model and its extensions
seem to be "the only game in town" as far as giving us a theoretical basis for
distinguishing among plausible alternative bargaining theories of the household.
4.4 Marriage Markets for Bargaining Spouses
A satisfactory theory of bargaining between spouses should be embedded in a
theory of marriage markets. In this discussion, in order to illustrate issues that
arise when marriage markets are combined with bargaining between spouses, we
use a much simpler model than is normally dealt with in the marriage market
literature. In particular, we make the barbaric assumption that every pair of
possible spouses faces the same utility possibility frontier if they marry as every
other pair. 28 The only difference between individuals is the utility that they
could achieve by remaining single.
Assume that the utility possibility frontier for every married couple is the
unit simplex and that there is a continuum of persons of each sex. Let Fh(u)
be the number of males in the population for whom the utility of being single
is less than u and let F,,(u) be the number of females in the population for
whom the utility of being single is less than u. Assume that these distribution
functions are strictly increasing and continuous, and that Ft(0) = 0, Fh(1) > 0,
F0 (0) = 0 and F.(1) > 0.
Let us first think about the marriage market that would arise if it were pos-
sible before marriage to determine the distribution of utility within marriages
by a binding contract. Then there would be a unique equilibrium utility dis-
tribution (u;,1 - us) such that the number of males who are willing to marry
2
The theory of mating and matching, which is thoroughly surveyed by Al Roth and Mar-
Ilda Satomayor,[l51 incorporates models in which different individuals could have arbitrarily
different rankings over members of the opposite sex as possible partners. While the the-
ory sketched here should be enriched to incorporate this feature, it seems apparent that the
qualitative results found here would extend to such models.
" Case iii. Divorce threat is credible for the wife, but not for the husband.
This happens if b,, + (1 - bh - b)/2 < me. In this case the solution is
u.= m and uh = 1- m,, > mh.
The first case corresponds to the Lundberg and Pollak's cooperative solution
where the threat point is not divorce, but a noncooperative marriage. In the
other two cases, the divorce threat is relevant, but notice that the outcome is
never the outcome predicted by the Mansur-Brown and McElroy-Horney mod-
els. In an equilibrium where both persons are better than they would be if
divorced, equilibrium is calculated as if the threat point were eternal burnt
toast rather than divorce. Small changes in the utility of being divorced would
have no effect on the outcome of household bargaining. In the only cases where
the divorce threat is relevant, the gains from marriage are not split equally as in
29
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and get utility uh equals the number of females who are willing to marry and
get uY, = 1 - ut. When the utility distribution between husbands and wives
is (u,, um), the supply of men wanting to marry is F(uh) and the supply of
women wanting to marry is F(u0 ). The unique equilibrium utility distribution
(ui,u,) is found by solving the equation Fh(uh) - F(1 - uh) = 0.29
Suppose, on the other hand, that neither party to a marriage can credibly
promise a utility distribution within marriage. Instead the utility distribution
within marriages is determined by the model of non-cooperative bargaining
that we have just discussed. Suppose that the utility distribution for any couple
during a period where they have not reached agreement is (bh, bi) and that the
time between offer and counteroffer is very short. Then, as predicted in our
model of non-cooperative bargaining, the distribution of utility in all marriages
will be (approximately)
(na, .) = b + (,bt bw). + (1.bh-b))
Given this utility distribution within marriages, the number of males who wish
to marry will be Fa(ii) and the number of females who wish to marry will
be F.(n.0 ). It is interesting to notice that there is no reason to expect that
Fa(ina) = Fe,.(ii.). Therefore, there will in general be either more men seeking
wives than women seeking husbands or vice versa. The inability to make prior
commitments to utility distributions within marriage has the same kind of effect
as price inflexibility in a commodity market. If, for example, the equilibrium
bargained utility distribution within marriages is such as to leave an excess
demand for wives, then all women who wish to marry under the current terms
of marriage will be able to do so, but some men who want to marry will not
find wives. Such a man would be willing to offer more favorable terms for a wife
than the current equilibrium utility. If he could make such promises credible,
then he would be able to induce some woman who currently prefer remaining
single to marry him, but she realizes that once married, they will be playing a
bargaining game in which the inevitable result is the equilibrium utility enjoyed
by all other married women.
The two best-known theories of marriage assignments are the theory of stable
marriage algorithms, developed by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley [26] and the
linear programming assignment model which was introduced to economics by
Martin Beckmann and Tjalling Koopmans [38] and applied to marriage markets
by Gary Becker []. Both of these models are more general than the example con-
sidered here in that they allow for differences in preference rankings over possible
marriage partners. In the Gale-Shapley theory no "side-payments" are allowed
2 "Existence follows from the assumption of continuity and the assumption that Fh(1) -
F.(0)> 0 and F(O) F-P.(1) < 0. The assumption that Fh and Fe are strictly increasing
functions implies that F(u) - F.(1 - u) is a strictly decreasing function of u. Therefore
equilibrium must be unique.
and there are no possibilities for negotiation about the terms of marriage.
3 0
The assignment problem assumes transferable utility, allowing binding premar-
ital agreements on any possible distribution of utility for any possible married
couple. The model of bargaining with non-cooperative marriage as the threat
point could be applied to the more general environment assumed in these mod-
els. In such a model, for any possible marriage there is a unique distribution
of utility that will be determined by the utility possibility frontier, the time-
discount rates of each party and the distribution of utility that will prevail if
they remain married but do not reach agreement. Therefore, the appropriate
model would be like the original Gale-Shapley in that each person assigns a fixed
utility to each possible marriage partner and that utility can not be altered by
proposing different terms of marriage.
Conclusion
An attraction of doing work in the economics of the family is that it has barely
begun to exploit fascinating work in modern evolutionary biology and anthro-
pology. A second attraction is that the economics of the family is well-poised to
exploit some of the most interesting recent results in game theory. This review
suggests that reexamining standard problems of economic demography such
as fertility, care for the elderly, and patterns of marriage from an evolutionary
viewpoint will lead to deeper insights and better-posed questions. As we observe
that the family life of a significant and growing fraction of our own population
is no longer characterized by stable, monogamous families, it becomes more im-
portant to try to understand the logic of other familial arrangements. There
is much to be learned by attention to the great body of enthographic work,
in which anthropologists have studied alternative, stable, functioning marital
systems. Modern game theory, particularly advances in bargaining theory and
in matching theory has much to contribute to the understanding of the for-
mation, functioning, and dissolution of marriages. The theoretical discussion
in the last section of this review concerns courtship and marriage in a monog-
amous society, with divorce functioning largely as an unexercised threat. It
would be interesting to apply some of these tools to less monogamous societies,
including a more realistic model of our own society. Such models might en-
compass out-of-wedlock parenthood, unmarried cohabiting couples, "sequential
polygamy" with marriages that are expected to be temporary, and interlocking
reconstituted families that include children from previous marriages.
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Appendix-The algebra of noncooperative equilibrium
Let ui be the equilibrium utility for the husband if he gets to make the first
offer and let u; be his equilibrium utility if the wife gets to make the first offer.
Let u" be the equilibrium utility for the wife if she gets to make the first offer
and let u2 be her equilibrium utility if the husband gets to make the first offer.
Let bh and b be the utilities that the husband and wife respectively would get
in any period where they do not reach agreement. Let bh + b,, < 1 and let the
utility possibility frontier for each period be {(u1, u2) > OJui + u2 = 1). Let us
suppose that there if the wife makes the first offer, the equilibrium payoffs will
be Ui for the wife and u2 for the husband and if the husband makes the first
offer, the equilibrium payoffs will be f4 for the husband and fi for the wife.
In the first period, if the husband accepts the offer of i, then since the
problem is stationary, he will continue to accept il in all subsequent periods.
Therefore his utility will be E io 1'. If he rejected her offer, he would receive
bh in the first period and in the next period it would be his turn to make the
offer. Then he would demand fit and offer his wife si and she would accept
the offer and continue to accept u2 in all subsequent periods. The husband's
utility if he follows this strategy would be bh + E9°i1OP. In equilibrium, the
husband must be just indifferent between accepting his wife's initial offer and
waiting one period to make a counteroffer. This will be the case if Z OinIt =
bh + E, _i'6', or equivalently if
ui= bh + i ( b .
and
Tss = be+-slc(a- bdn- bt).
This is the result claimed in the text.
iiz - b,, a(,- Z) (1)
Similarly, it must be that if ni and iy are equilibrium strategies for the
wife, then she will be indifferent between accepting uZ if it is her husband's
turn to make an offer and refusing his offer and countering with a demand of i'
in the next period. This leads by an exactly parallel argument to the equation
The feasibility constraints for offers are:
0i + = 1




When we solve the linear equations 1-4 for the variables sii, s, si, and si,
we find that the solutions are:
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